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“A fact without a theory 
Is like a ship without a sail, 
Is like a boat without a rudder, 
Is like a kite without a tail. 
A fact without a ﬁgure 
Is a tragic ﬁnal act. 
But one thing worse 
In this universe 
Is a theory without a fact.” 
- George Shultz   
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Summary 
  
The focus of this research is in the area of behavioral economics, with a 
concentration on the decision-making process of individuals who may potentially 
participate in an aggravated collective action. Such a study is important as it sheds 
light on the motivations behind the actions taken by individual rioters and thus the 
riotous group. This provides an understanding of the evolution of a riot as well as 
an evaluation of the costs and benefits it generates. The research approach adopted 
in this study includes a review and interpretation of quantitative data from a 
historic riot, and the development of a model for the decision-making process of a 
potential rioter. The findings from this research provide evidence that individual 
rioters’ assessment of costs and benefits is dependent on the number of individuals 
rioting. Furthermore, an individual evaluates differently under a sufficient level of 
stress due to reduced cognitive abilities. Reduced abilities cause a short-sidedness in 
the individual’s evaluation and decision-making process. The result is that an 
individual will be biased towards the variables representing short-run benefits 
which are dominated by intuitive reasoning. This leads to the utility seeking 
individual being more likely to choose participation. In sum, the main conclusion 
drawn from this study is that the act of rioting can be deemed as a rational choice in 
economic terms. This work recommends that further research be conducted in this 
area. Specifically, that further inquiries be made into the rationality of aggravated 
collective action and that experimental research be conducted so that the model 
presented here can be tested and further examined. 
 
 
Keywords: Riot, Collective behavior, Rational choice theory, Conditional decision 
theory, Threshold model, Dual-processing model, Effects of stressors, Behavioral 
economics, Decision-making model, Group dynamics  
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After focusing on riots, a model was developed which appeared both instinctive and 
plausible for describing a rioter’s destructive and aggravated behavior. This model 
supports complimenting theories and concepts, which when infused together provide 
an explanation for how an extreme action in an extreme circumstance could be seen 
as rational at the time of decision. 
There is an endless list of people that I would like to recognize and thank for their 
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1 Introduction 
 
The decision to initiate or join a riotous event often seems perplexing at first 
glance. However it is with a second look and deeper evaluation, that this choice can 
be explained as rational. This thesis will discuss two alternative explanations of the 
riots. Both explanations incorporate Granovetter’s Threshold Model of riots (1978), 
but hold somewhat different accounts for the individual preferences. One explanation 
is consistent with standard rationality and based on the assumption of stable 
preferences, where riots present easy gains through looting with low probabilities of 
penalties. The alternative explanation uses dual system theory and presents rioters as 
less rational. This alternative argues that being in the midst of a riot changes 
individuals’ preferences towards a lower emphasis on long term consequences. While 
there is clearly evidence of reduced probabilities of penalties, this work argues that at 
least some of the observations from the 2011 London Riots support the dual system 
explanation. 
The term ‘riot’ is often defined in studies of collective action as an event closely 
resembling an offense against the ordinary social order in the form of a gathering or 
demonstration, which is committed by three or more persons against person or 
property, and includes the use of violence (Lachman, 1996) (McPhail and Wohlstein, 
1983). In this study, the term ‘riot’ is fixed as: an offense against the ordinary social 
order committed by a number of individuals; this number must then be sufficiently 
large for the potential participant performing the analysis to deem it as a riot.  The 
decision to riot is defined as rational for each individual based on an analysis of the 
costs and benefits for that individual. The individual is deemed rational if their 
preferences are utility maximizing, internally consistent and seek the optimal level of 
information (Kahneman, 2011). In others words, if the individual seeks the highest 
net gain with a consistent end goal in the most efficient manner, they are considered 
rational.  
Riots are a useful example of situations where the rationale behind certain 
actions, at times, can be perceived as unclear. One riot stood out among the others as 
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particularly puzzling, the London Riots of 2011. After reading the firsthand accounts 
and commentaries from the London Riots, an intriguing question emerged. What 
could motivate the participants to cause destruction on such a large scale, when it 
knowingly carries large costs for the nation as well as for the individual? Moreover, 
could these actions be explained by standard economic theory? 
The development of the London Riots were triggered “on Thursday, August 4, 
2011, upon the death of Mark Duggan, a Tottenham Black resident” after “a peaceful 
vigil of 200 people” for the deceased suddenly “escalated rapidly” into violence (Bev, 
2011, Kindle Loc. 39, 40). The setting of the vigil was the London borough of 
Tottenham, which “is considered one of the most ethnically diverse neighborhoods in 
Europe with people speaking more than 200 languages” (Bev, 2011, Kindle Loc. 42-
43). The death of Mark Duggan was “allegedly caused by police shooting in a Scotland 
Yard operation on gun and drug-related activities” (Bev, 2011, Kindle Loc. 40). The 
initial cause for collective action was noted as holding little significance for the 
majority of the riots participants (R.C. & V.P., 2011; 2012). Once initiated, activity 
began to multiply “with unprecedented speed” and by Sunday, August 7 riotous 
activity had spread to twelve additional areas in London (R.C. & V.P., 2012, p. 19). By 
the end of the riots on August 10, thirty-one areas within London had reported over 
40 crimes each (R.C. & V.P., 2011; 2012). 
In the case of the London Riots, as with many others, there was a moment and 
group responsible for its initiation. The group in London was one that had already 
formed to commemorate the deceased. But the action of the group is not necessarily 
an unanimously agreed upon decision. It is with the recognition that a group “is not a 
homogenous mass, but a collection of smaller crowds and individuals with their own 
needs, wants and expectations,” that this study’s focus is transferred from the group 
to the individual (Challenger, Clegg & Robinson, p. 275). One individual in the group 
wishes to express their emotions in a more vocal or even destructive manner. Then 
another sees the active individual and is swayed into activity. A domino effect occurs 
and the group grows wildly, and in London without connection or concern for the 
initial trigger. It is as if the “truth became irrelevant” to both rioters and law 
enforcement alike (Tucker, 2011, Kindle Loc. 81). 
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It is challenging to establish an accurate number of how many participated in 
the days of rioting and looting. One method is to look at the number of those arrested 
during the riots and its aftermath, which is over 3,000 individuals (Benyon, 2012) 
(R.C. & V.P., 2012). However, it seems from most firsthand accounts that this 
number falls significantly short of portraying an accurate picture. One initial report 
published by the government sponsored Riots Communities and Victims Panel (R.C. 
& V.P.) estimated that “perhaps as many as 13,000-15,000 were actively involved in 
the riots” (2011, p. 24). There were also reports of the participants being of every age, 
race, background and affiliation. All in all, a profile for the average rioter does not 
appear to emerge from the accounts (R.C. & V.P., 2011). Although, it was highlighted 
in the final report published seven months after the riots by the R.C. & V. P. that “the 
majority of rioters were under twenty-four” and “that seventy percent of those 
brought before the courts came from the thirty percent most deprived areas” (2012, p. 
115).  
When reading reports and commentaries on the London Riots from local 
newspapers, there appears to be a recognition of some unrest in the London borough 
of Tottenham, but by many accounts the extreme outbursts of violence appeared 
sudden and unexpected (Sky News, 2011). The R.C. & V.P. reported an estimated cost 
of over 300 million English pounds in property damages in just five days of rioting, 
while the final bill was estimated to be around half a billion pounds (R.C. & V.P., 
2011). There were no noticeable objectives or central targets during the riots. Much of 
the destruction and thievery was done opportunistically, according to firsthand 
accounts. Fires were started as a way of eliminating any evidence pointing to who had 
participated in the theft (Quinn & Adams, 2011). Stores of all sizes and types, “both 
large and mom-and-pop neighborhood stores,” were looted and set ablaze (Bev, 2011, 
Kindle Loc., 46-47). Shops were destroyed in the rioters own neighborhoods as well 
as in other’s. In fact, the shattered shops, cars and the living quarters located directly 
above the shops could have been owned by someone a rioter knew, perhaps 
acquaintances, friends or even relatives (R.C. & V.P., 2011).   
The desire to conclude whether the choice to riot could be deemed rational 
became stronger after reviewing the extensive damages and costs caused during the 
course of the London Riots. There was public destruction and personal cost as well, 
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so that when all costs were fully realized in the long-run, it seemed improbable that 
the benefits gained from participation could outweigh the costs. This begged the 
question, why would an individual choose to participate when it resulted in a negative 
outcome? In an attempt to find the reasoning behind the decision to riot, this work 
turned to one of the most significant features of a riot, stress. An investigation then 
began into the connection between stressors and the decision-making process as well 
as if a riot could impose a sufficient level of stress that would impair a person’s 
cognitive abilities. The search for the reason behind the riots then became a matter of 
if these decisions were the result of limited cognitive abilities, as well as if these 
individuals were considering, or even capable of considering, the long-run 
consequences of their decisions. For as much as a sufficient level of stress carries the 
ability to inhibit a person’s decision-making process, it would likewise be capable of 
impairing their ability to entertain the long-run consequences of their actions 
(Thompson, 2010).  
It is therefore the hypothesis of this study that the decision to participate in a 
riot can be defined as a rational act. In agreement with Granovetter (1978), this study 
holds that an individual’s decision to participate in a riot is not only dependent on the 
benefits outweighing the costs, but also on the number of active participants within 
the population. This makes it more likely that potential rioters will choose to 
participate as the total number of rioters increases.  
This work then gives two alternative theories for how an individual arrives at 
the decision to participate. One theory is supported by standard economic theory, 
which states that an individual performs a cost-benefit analysis as the riot grows and 
then makes a decision which they do not regret later. It is assumed that certain 
benefits increase as the number of participants increases, while certain costs are 
decreasing in the number of participants. It is also assumed that each potential 
participant’s benefits will become greater than their costs of participation at a certain 
point that corresponds with a specific number of participants.  This number of 
participants must be satisfied in order to sufficiently lower costs and raise benefits 
(Granovetter, 1978).   
The second theory addresses the limitation of a potential participant’s 
cognitive abilities and is founded in the well-established proposition that individuals 
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possess separate yet simultaneous dual-systems of cognitive processing (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2005). The simultaneous dual cognitive processes are the system 1, 
related to intuitive reasoning, and system 2, related to deliberate reasoning (Evans, 
2008; 2003) (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  It is assumed that a riot has the ability 
to lower and limit an individual’s cognitive abilities to intuitive processes when a 
sufficient level of stress is present (Thompson, 2010). Once the brain is held captive 
within intuitive thinking, it is no longer able to consider the long-run costs, such as 
damages to infrastructure or future tax increases exacted in order to pay for repairs 
(Thompson, 2010). It can then be demonstrated how the cost-benefit analysis can be 
limited to the short-run net gain (Thompson, 2010) (Hammond, 2000) (Toates, 
1995) (Maule & Hockey, 1993). When the potential rioter is able to perform a short-
run cost-benefit analysis, they are able to discount the long-run costs and focus on 
the instant emotional and monetary gains (Thompson, 2010). The potential rioter is 
then more likely to deduce that the benefits of participation will outweigh the costs by 
ignoring the long-run costs, making it possible for the participant to wonder about, or 
even regret, their decision to riot in the long-run. This makes the analysis capable of 
explaining why rational individuals plunge into riotous activity. Whereas the 
standard cost-benefit analysis demands a consideration of the long-run costs and 
therefore, in many cases, cannot explain how the benefits outweigh the costs for some 
participants. 
The incorporation of the existence of a threshold requirement as well as of 
simultaneous dual-processing is essential for explaining the act of rioting as rational. 
Both explanations for participation advocate the importance of the series of decisions 
and the aggregation of participants in the development of a riot. One demonstrates 
the importance of the growing population of participants, and the other of how the 
individual is affected by stressors originating from the very event that they are now 
choosing to mimic. However it is when the two explanations are combined that a full 
picture is comprised that can show how there is a greater probability that benefits will 
outweigh costs which then supports the decision to embark on riotous behavior. Yet it 
is most important to note that whether the explanations are considered separately or 
combined, they provide evidence that the decision to participate in a riot can be 
deemed as rational, creating the basis for a rational choice theory for riots. 
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The distress and disruption caused by riots has motivated considerable 
interest in understanding the decision-making processes that determine a potential 
participant’s response to a riotous environment. The sheer number of riots 
throughout the world points to the importance and necessity of undertaking this type 
of research. There is currently a lack of research directly addressing the rationality of 
rioters. New frontiers triumphed by empirical research are providing additional 
models, theories and frameworks as well as advances on older models, in order to 
address the decisions of potential riot participants. The models included, as 
addressed in The Riot Threshold Model, have individually proven themselves in a 
wide range of impressive work, but have yet to be combined. It is for this reason that 
this study investigates the decision-making process of potential riot participants. 
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2 Modeling 
 
This work begins with a basic cost and benefit analysis for participation in 
order to make greater sense of the 2011 London Riots. The first undertaking is to 
define the variables that are considered to represent the most influential concerns for 
analysis. According to Gordon Tullock (1971) and Morris Silver (1971), certain 
variables are able to represent the costs and benefits of participation which then 
explain the decision for or against collective action. From the summation of these 
variables, a private interest equation is created which can then be utilized to evaluate 
an individual’s decision-making process. Tullock’s model is in fact the inspiration and 
basis for Silver’s model and private interest equation. The sole distinction between 
Tullock and Silver’s equations is that Silver chooses to include one additional 
variable.  
2.1 GORDON TULLOCK’S PRIVATE INTEREST THEORY OF 
REVOLUTION  
Gordon Tullock’s Private Interest Theory of Revolution is a rational choice 
model which presents an individual’s interest in public action as characterized by the 
requirement of “selective incentives” as the explanation for participation in the 
pursuit of public goods (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, p. 96). He constructs a model where 
“the public good aspects of a revolution are of relatively little importance in the 
decision to participate” while “the discounted value of the rewards and punishment is 
the crucial factor” (Tullock, 1971, p. 92). This model is summarized in Tullock’s 
equation for the evaluation of costs and benefits of participation in a revolution. This 
equation is expanded on by Morris Silver. Tullock’s equation is presented below in 
the following section with one modification, Morris Silver’s single added variable at 
the end of Tullock’s equation. 
2.2 MORRIS SILVER’S EXPANSION ON PRIVATE INTEREST THEORY 
Morris Silver’s elaboration on the Gordon Tullock’s equation maintains the 
same goal of quantifying the net gain of participation in aggravated collective 
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behavior (Silver, 1971). Corresponding to Tullock, Silver employs an equation for 
individual net gain or loss due to participation in a revolution. Silver’s equation 
utilizes the same definitions and terms for the variables included. Silver then adds 
one variable to the equation represented by the term V, which measures “the value of 
the participant's time and other resources” (Silver, 1971, p. 64). This addition to 
Tullock is considered to create a superior representation of the potential participant’s 
choice since it includes this basic personal cost. The equation for private interest for 
participation in revolutionary activity then becomes:   
               (    )              
where:  
   = Net gain (or loss) to individual from participation rather than remaining neutral.  
  = Private reward (e.g., income, power, status) to individual for participation in 
revolution if revolution succeeds.  
   = Likelihood of revolutionary victory assuming subject is neutral. 
   = Private penalty imposed on individual for participation in revolution if revolt 
fails.  
   = Likelihood of injury through participation in revolution.  
   = Injury suffered in action.  
  = Psychic income from participation.  
  = Value of participant's time and other resources.  
Here, an increase in net gain    will encourage and “intensify” the efforts of 
current revolutionaries, as well as increase the number of participants (Silver, 1971, p. 
64). If the increase in revolutionary participation is sufficient, the period is defined as 
a revolution. Silver further clarifies that “any collective good an individual expects to 
be produced…will be ‘consumed’ by him whether he participates or remains neutral,” 
(1) 
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and therefore the public good aspect is not a determinant of participation and can be 
left out of the net payoff equation (Silver, 1971, p. 64). 
 Since both a revolution and a riot are considered to be an accumulation of 
individuals participating in aggravated collective behavior, the two events can be 
related as social conflicts. The number of similarities and strong connection between 
these two types of collective behavior are supported by other studies of social conflict, 
such as in Oberschall (1978). In light of this connection, it is natural to assume that 
potential participants of a revolution consider many of the same cost and benefit 
variables as those who may join a riot. It is for this reason that the variables of 
significance for revolutionaries, as shown by the Silver Model, are utilized as the 
starting point for the Riot Threshold Model.  
2.3 THE RIOT THRESHOLD MODEL 
 For the potential participant to be a rational utility seeker, the individual must 
pursue the action that will provide them with the maximum net gain. Consequently 
the net gain from participation must be higher than the net cost for the act of rioting 
to be defined as rational.  
The Riot Threshold Model assumes that costs and benefit variables can be 
expressed in a similar way to the Silver Model (1971). One pivotal change is that many 
variables of the Riot Threshold Model are dependent on the expected number of 
participants in the riot at the time of decision, represented by n instead of being 
dependent on outcome. This modification is supported by Granovetter (1978) which 
demonstrates the importance of the number of participants in decisions of aggravated 
collective action. By making the participant’s net gain dependent on n, the following 
equation can be seen as a formulization of Mark Granovetter’s Threshold Model 
(1978). This addition of n to the Silver Model is further founded in the generally 
accepted notion that “the choice about whether to remain calm or to engage in 
violence is subject to the general rule that the more other people are rioting, the more 
likely any particular individual is to join in” (Watts, 2011, Kindle Loc. 1078-80). The 
increased likelihood of participation is reflected in the Riot Threshold Model. Where 
the cost variables that are dependent on n decrease as n increases, while the benefit 
variables increase as n increases, as further explained below.  
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Therefore, as inspired by the Silver Model (1971) and Granovetter’s Threshold 
Model (1978), the following private interest equation for the ascertainment of the net 
gain or loss for each individual’s cost-benefit analysis was developed:  
            ( )       ( )    
where: 
   = Net gain (or loss) to individual from participation rather than remaining neutral.  
  = Private revenue and reward (e.g., income, power, status) to individual for 
participation in the riot. 
  ( ) = Private penalty imposed on individual for participation in riot. 
  = Expected number of persons participating in riot at time of evaluation and 
decision.  
   =Potential for injury suffered in action.  
 ( ) = Emotional benefit from participation.  
  = Cost of individual's time and other resources.  
It is assumed that   ( )    and    ( )     
 This model presents important departures from the Silver Model. As 
mentioned, the net gain and private penalty for the potential participant is not 
dependent on the actual outcome of the conflict. The reason for this alteration stems 
from and is in recognition of a subtle difference in the nature of a riot versus a 
revolution. In a riot situation, it can be assumed that the personal gain an individual 
incurs during a riot does not depend on the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the conflict. This 
notion is backed by multiple accounts of historic riots, including the 2011 London 
Riots, which show that the majority of private revenue is acquired through looting, 
theft, scavenging or a recognition of participation from colleagues and neighbors 
(R.C. & V.P., 2011; 2012) (Quinn & Adams, 2011) (Lewis & Harkin, 2011) (Williams, 
2011). Due to the origins of these personal gains and the methods by which they are 
(2) 
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achieved, these acquisitions are typically not lost even if the riot is a ‘failure’ (Conteh-
Morgan, 2004). The separation of outcome from personal gain and private penalty is 
additionally logical for riot situations that do not possess a specific agenda, such as 
increased exposure of a group, social issue or imminent crisis.  
 A seemingly minor yet significant change from the Silver Model is the revision 
of the definition of the E variable. In the Riot Threshold model the E variable shifts 
from “psychic income” to “emotional benefit.” This change was made in order to 
emphasize the effects of emotions on the decision-making process, as well as to 
reinforce the distinction between intuitive and deliberate choices. Another modest 
change from the Silver Model to the present model is the notation of one of the 
variables. The variable representing the cost of a participant's time and other 
resources is changed from Silver’s V to the current C. This change was merely made 
for convenience and to emphasis that the time and resources spent are costs.  
The final and most pivotal departure from the Silver model is the inclusion and 
role of the n variable. Two of the variables in the private interest equation of the Riot 
Threshold Model are dependent on n, while four are independent. These variables 
will now be further expanded on in the order by which they appear in the private 
interest equation. However it should first be reiterated that it is assumed that a 
conflict is only defined as a ‘riot’ when the number of expected participants is greater 
than or equal to what the evaluator defines as a riot. In other words,   must be 
sufficiently high so that the individual performing the analysis deems the conflict to 
be a riot.  
A prospective rioter is facing a potential revenue that is independent of the 
number of persons currently rioting. Once an individual has decided to engage in the 
riot, their acquisitions are not limited by the number of individuals but by their 
ability to obtain and keep goods. In this manner, potential revenue can be seen 
primarily as a product of the participant’s ability to loot, steal, scavenge and claim 
recognition from peers.  
Private penalty is the first of the two variables to be dependent on n. The 
probability of facing a penalty is decreasing in n, since the likelihood of any one 
person being pursued by law enforcement or other protective forces lowers as the 
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group grows. This in a sense gives participants an ability to hide within the numbers 
(Lachman, 1996). Additionally, as the group size increases it becomes more difficult 
for the police or other protective forces to effectively stop or penalize the group as a 
whole. One reason for this is that the cost of persecution becomes significantly higher 
as the magnitude of the group becomes too great. The probability of encountering law 
enforcement could be captured by taking the number of law officers divided by the 
population of the riot. However, since not every encounter with law enforcement 
would result in a penalty being given, this number would only give a conceptual idea 
of the probability. The consequences of the cost of prosecution and the limited budget 
of law enforcement are later discussed in greater detail in the Discussion portion of 
this work. 
The potential for injury is independent of n and remains constant. This is due 
to the fact that individuals have the same potential for injury if only a few are rioting 
or if there is a large group. It should be marked that the possibility of injury could 
theoretically decrease as the number of rioters increase, once again due to a 
participant’s ability to hide within the numbers. However, the probability has an 
equal chance of potentially increasing as the chance for encountering hazardous 
activities rises. Such harmful instances could include being trapped in a fire or panic 
run. For these reasons, it appears most appropriate for this variable to remain 
constant. 
The emotional benefit gained from participation is dependent on n. Emotional 
benefit is increasing in n due to the increased acceptance and encouragement by the 
group for displaying favorable emotions toward the event. This in turn increases the 
quantity and degree of emotional outbursts, which then provide the participant with a 
psychological ‘release,’ sense of gratification and rush from emotional excitement 
(Conteh-Morgan, 2004) (Lachman, 1996). Emotional benefit is furthermore 
increasing in n due to the pleasure and fun a participant may find in the act itself. As 
in the case of the 2011 London Riots, it was pointed out in a number of firsthand 
accounts that many participants may have seen the riots as a reprieve from boredom. 
This was due to several of the summer activities such as swimming areas and youth 
programs, which many had taken advantage of in previous years, no longer being 
available due to nation-wide budget cuts (R.C. & V.P., 2011).  
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Finally, the variable for personal cost of time and effort is independent of n. As 
a personal choice, it is most likely to be independent of the number of rioters. It is 
assumed that once the initial decision to participate is made, that personal cost is 
only dependent on the how much each participant is willing to invest in the moment. 
  Now that the variables within the model have been expanded upon, attention 
can be directed to how the model can be utilized to identify if a prospective rioter will 
agree or decline to participate. An individual is motivated to become a rioter if and 
only if the benefits of participation are strictly greater than the costs of participation. 
If the individual’s costs and benefits are equal, they will be indifferent to 
participation. This work assumes that this indifference will lead to individuals 
continuing in their current state of non-riotous activity, with an outcome of refraining 
from participation. Therefore, a person will choose to become a rioter if, 
 ( )              ( ) 
  ( )       ( )    
As previously mentioned, emotional benefits are increasing in n, while the potential 
for private penalty is decreasing in n. The result is that the net gain of participation 
increases as the number of current participants increases. This in turn supports 
Granovetter (1978), demonstrating how an increase in n increases the probability 
that another potential participant will join.  
Each potential participant’s benefits will become greater than their costs for 
participation at a certain point that corresponds to a specific number of participants. 
This specific number of participants must be satisfied in order to sufficiently lower 
costs and raise benefits (Granovetter, 1978). The number of participants required is 
represented by   . As seen in Figure 1, at    the emotional benefit gained from 
participation less private penalty is greater than the constant variables of individual 
cost and potential injury minus private revenue and therefore the potential rioter will 
wish to join.  
Thus far, the elaboration above has imparted how an individual assesses the 
costs, benefits and ultimately the net gain of participation. It is recognized that this 
action is influenced by the number of active participants at the time of decision. 
(3) 
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However, further exploration is needed in order to fully understand how the action of 
one affects another and amounts to the collective product. It is here that this study 
turns to game theory for additional evidentiary support. 
 
Fig. 1. An individual’s cost and benefits of participation in terms of the number of expected rioters 
2.4 THE RIOT THRESHOLD MODEL AS A COORDINATION GAME 
A coordination problem is a situation where an individual endeavors to make a 
rational choice while facing an uncertain outcome due to the various possible 
strategies the other player or players can select depending on the structure of the 
game. In this problem, multiple individuals have the potential of realizing gains but 
only when the decision of each player is consistent with that of every other player. 
The coordination puzzle therefore has multiple equilibria. A well-known example of a 
coordination puzzle, and one that can be used to exhibit a simplified riot, is the Battle 
of the Sexes game. As shown in Gintis (2009), this game has two players, a husband 
and wife. The husband would prefer to go gambling, while the wife would prefer to 
attend the opera. However both would prefer to go to one event together rather than 
to go to either event separately. The game therefore has two pure-strategy equilibria, 
were both go gambling or both go to the opera, and one mixed-strategy equilibrium, 
were the couple do both activities but only for a portion of the time. The payoffs of 
pure-strategy equilibria are greater than the payoffs of the mixed-strategy. Therefore, 
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each person has an incentive to choose the outcome that the other is also committing 
to, with no desire to deviate. 
A riot can then be viewed as a simplified coordination game similar to the 
Battle of the Sexes game. In the case of a riot, as the number of individuals who are 
rioting increases, the costs will decrease and in turn the benefits of being a part of the 
riot increase (Granovetter, 1978). One person may have more to gain than another 
from a riot or a non-riot outcome, but both will benefit from coordinating their 
actions. Therefore, each participant is better off and has an incentive to pursue a 
pure-strategy equilibria. The study of crowd behavior as a game in Berk (1974) 
likewise supports this conclusion. 
A game that includes the entire population of rioters, represented by N, 
requires each rioter to be identical in that they hold a specific number of participants 
which must satisfied before the will choose to participate. This specific number is 
represented by    and strictly greater than 1. In a riot game, the two pure-strategy 
equilibria are as follows: If every other player is rioting, it is optimal to riot. If every 
other player is not rioting, it is optimal to not riot. The equilibrium that is ultimately 
achieved depends on the preferences of the players. As seen in the previous section, 
these preferences can be expressed in terms of   . If    is less than the current 
population of the riot N, then there is no riot. If   is greater than the current 
population N, then there is a full riot.  
One way of demonstrating a riot as a coordination game is with a payoff 
matrix, as shown below in Matrix 1. The following payoff matrix is an example of the 
choices that two potential rioters face. In each cell, the first number represents the 
payoff to Player 1, a potential rioter, and the second number represents the payoff to 
Player 2. R symbolizes the choice to riot, while No symbolizes the choice to not riot. 
As seen in Matrix 1, if both players choose the same action, they will have positive 
payoffs. Therefore, in a one-shot game, each potential participant will prefer to riot 
only if the other person is rioting, and will prefer to decline to riot if other does so as 
well. 
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Matrix. 1. 
 
No Riot:        ,     ( )           
Full Riot:     ,     ( )            
The payoffs that appear in Matrix 1 are symmetrical in order to present the 
most simplistic example of the game. However it is highly plausible for one pure-
strategy equilibrium to carry higher or lower payoffs than the other. What then, 
makes the players coordinate and achieve one equilibrium? This question requires 
more than simply looking at the payoffs of the possible equilibria. The two pure-
strategy equilibria are beneficial for demonstrating the extremes of a riot, but cannot 
address the progression of the event. Since the majority of riots typically exist at a 
number of participants that falls between full riot and no riot, further explanation is 
needed.  
According to Granovetter & Soong (1986), the missing link can be found in the 
time between these two equilibria. Therefore, the coordination efforts become about 
the decisions that occur during the progression of the riot from the point of zero 
participants to all. A plausible enrichment to the explanation of how riots begin and 
evolve is found in the threshold model, and specifically Granovetter’s Threshold 
Model (1978). This model addresses the time between full and no riot by treating the 
game as sequential rather than simultaneous. Granovetter argues that the threshold 
model is an improvement over game theory models since it is able to “take the two 
(4) 
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elements of collective behavior which game theory handles only with difficulty and 
makes them central: substantial heterogeneity of preferences and interdependence of 
decisions over time” (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1435). In other words, the model allows 
for the behavior of participants to be evaluated as serial rather than parallel choices. 
Serial choices then permits a scenario in which each potential participant observes 
their surroundings in order to assess how many individuals are participating. 
Furthermore, the evaluation is seen as repeated at each stage of the riot. This in turn 
opens a riot to be evaluated as a continuous accumulation of individuals (Macy, 1991) 
(Granovetter, 1978) (Granovetter & Soong, 1986) (Rolfe, 2004).  
Granovetter is, in a sense, in harmony with game theory in that it holds many 
of the same concepts, such as the idea that individuals coordinate. However it is also 
a continuation in that it addresses the sequential limitation of game theory. 
Granovetter’s Threshold Model is also a helpful addition as it is backward thinking, 
while game models are forward thinking. It is for these reasons that this study now 
turns to Granovetter’s Threshold Model in order to further develop the Riot 
Threshold Model. 
2.5 GRANOVETTER’S THRESHOLD MODEL AND THE RIOT 
THRESHOLD MODEL  
 Up to this point in the development of this model, the private interest equation 
for participation and the simultaneous game model have been utilized for describing 
the rationale behind the choice to partake in a riot. The development of the cost-
benefit analysis and the coordination game are an “advance over crude 
psychologizing about crowds' stripping away the "veneer" of civilization from their 
participants,” which has previously been common throughout theories of crowd and 
collective action (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1421). However, even after the choice to 
coordinate in a full riot is explained as rational, the question still remains of how the 
riot is initiated and coordinates to one equilibrium. Why do some individuals act first, 
helping to ignite what would later evolve into a full riot? It is for this reason that it 
can be said that knowing simultaneous game outcomes as well as “the norms, 
preferences, motives, and beliefs of participants in collective behavior can, in most 
cases, only provide a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the explanation of 
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outcomes” (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1421). In order to find the sufficient condition, this 
study turns to Granovetter’s Threshold Model (1978).  
The threshold model is valuable in explaining collective action as it has the 
ability to “take the ‘strangeness’ often associated with collective behavior out of the 
heads of actors and put it into the dynamics of situations” by assessing the situation 
as the result of an accumulation of choices within a crowd (Granovetter, 1978, p. 
1442). Therefore, this study supports Granovetter in the belief that in order to 
provide a full and sufficient explanation for how a riot begins, as well as develops, 
“one needs a model of how these individual preferences interact and aggregate” 
through a series of sequential acts (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1421). 
By utilizing Granovetter’s model, the outcomes of group behavior can be 
scrutinized in light of the entire population of rioters, uniting individual behavior and 
collective action. Once the original actions are explained, a threshold model can be 
used in order to share how the riot continues to evolve. Granovetter’s Threshold 
Model, as termed by Macy (1991), also called the ‘Riot Model’ by Watts (2011), and 
simultaneous game theory models share the assumption that all individuals are 
rational utility maximizers and possess complete information (Macy, 1991). The 
model is intended for cases where an individual is facing a binary decision where they 
are presented with two distinct and mutually exclusive alternatives (Granovetter, 
1978) (Watts, 2011). Moreover, the cost and benefits of a decision for each individual 
is dependent in part on how many other individuals in the group chose the same 
alternative, making it a conditional decision model (Granovetter & Soong, 1986) 
(Rolfe, 2004). It is for this reason that Granovetter’s Threshold Model is an 
appropriate application for a riot, and that this study evaluates these first individual’s 
actions in terms of a threshold model.  
The threshold requirement is the foundation of the threshold model for 
collective behavior (Granovetter, 1978) (Granovetter & Soong, 1986) (Watts, 2011) 
(Macy, 1991). According to Granovetter, each potential rioter possesses a numerical 
‘threshold’ that must be satisfied in order for them to join. This numerical threshold 
is defined as the number of individuals who must make the same decision before one 
follows the same action. Potential participants’ expectations are adaptive and are 
evaluated at each stage of the riot as it develops. Once the riot has begun, each stage 
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of the riot is associated with a specific number of current participants which begins at 
one and continues sequentially. When a one additional individual joins, a new stage 
has begun and a new evaluation takes place. The threshold does not need to be 
satisfied at any particular stage of the riot in order to motivate participation. It simply 
needs to be satisfied at any stage of the riot and then be maintained. In other words, 
the threshold is the lower limit equivalent to the number of people who must be 
currently participating in the riot for the potential rioter to consider joining. The 
threshold requirement is also related to the previously defined   , since it is also “the 
point where net benefits begin to exceed net costs for that particular actor” 
(Granovetter, 1978, p. 1420).  
Every individual has a numerical threshold of social influence where they will 
find themselves tipping from serenity to violence (Watts, 2011). Some individuals, 
such as “rabble rousers” or organized criminals, possess very low thresholds, while 
others, such as a diligent citizen or local politicians, have very high thresholds (Watts, 
2011, Kindle Loc. 1086) (R.C. & V.P., 2011). The higher the threshold requirement, 
the more time and stages that are necessary for it to be satisfied. One factor that has 
the ability accelerate the growth of a riot is an increased speed or greater ease of 
access to information about the growing number of participants.  
The threshold model that is utilized for this study is a departure from 
Granovetter’s Threshold Model in that it considers n to be the absolute number of 
current riot participants in the evaluator’s immediate surroundings and not a 
proportion. For clarification, the immediate surroundings are defined as the area in 
an individual’s environment that they can view or hear. In other words, it is the area 
that a person can perceive firsthand at the moment of evaluation. The definition for a 
threshold requirement, as utilized in the Riot Threshold Model, most resembles 
Watts’s simplified description of Granovetter’s model. Watts describes how a riot 
comes to be among a crowd of a hundred: where “exactly one person…has a threshold 
of zero, while another has a threshold of one other person, another has a threshold of 
two other people, and so on all the way up to the most conservative person, who will 
join in only after all ninety-nine others have” (Watts, 2011, Kindle Loc. 1093-94).  
Granovetter (1978), in contrast, defines the threshold requirement by 
establishing the threshold x, the frequency distribution, the cumulative distribution 
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function and the proportion of the population who have joined a riot by time t using 
discrete time periods. The cumulative distribution function then represents the 
proportion of the population having a threshold requirement less than or equal to x. 
This difference in definition may seem somewhat obvious or insignificant, but it has 
an important effect on the outcome. The reason for this change is that individuals 
under stress make decisions based on predominately intuitive processes, such as 
dividing the crowd immediately before them into groups of agitators and non-
agitators and then counting the group. They are less likely to use advanced 
computations, such as calculating the percentage of agitators among the population 
(Kahneman 2011) (Kahneman & Fredrick, 2005) (Hammond, 2000). The transition 
from considering a percentage to using an absolute number in the immediate 
surroundings is therefore held to be in greater accordance with research findings, as 
seen in Kahneman (2011) and Kahneman & Fredrick (2005). The use of an absolute 
number is likewise reinforced by firsthand accounts, as seen in Morrell et al (2011) as 
well as Quinn and Adams (2011). 
In this model an individual will count themselves as the first n in their 
evaluation, since their choice to participate would result in 1+n.  Accordingly the first 
individual to consider rioting does not have a threshold requirement of zero, but of 
one. This is another small yet important change from Granovetter’s model (1978). 
There is an assumed heterogeneity in the population of rioters.  The threshold 
requirement for participation is represented by   ( ) and can be shown as the 
following,  
  ( )                                       
     ( 
 )      ( 
 )            
These individual thresholds requirements can then be ranked within the 
population according to their i, where, 
  ( )    ( )    ( )    ( ) 
One note is needed concerning the application of threshold requirements to 
collective behavior. Caution should be exhibited when applying and ranking 
thresholds in an experiment or empirical study due to a minimum of two note-worthy 
(5) 
(6) 
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errors that can occur, which Granovetter (1978) himself highlighted. These errors 
include: (1) “Thresholds may be only imperfectly measured by one's position in the 
time sequence of adoption; measurement error, imperfect information, and chance 
personal events unrelated to the innovation may result in this” inaccuracy in 
calculating an individual’s threshold requirement (p. 1440). Coupled with (2) “Where 
the R2 of multiple regressions falls much under 1.0, the predicted threshold 
distributions may vary significantly from the true ones” (p. 1440). However, 
populations “whose distributions have highly stable equilibria might nevertheless 
yield good predictions from this procedure” (p. 1440). In sum, the ranking of 
thresholds poses an empirical challenge to researchers since Granovetter’s model is 
backward looking and thresholds are established after the fact. 
If the threshold requirement of each individual within the population is 
satisfied, then a riot will occur. In other words, if: 
  ( )          for all i 
then each individual’s threshold requirement is satisfied and each member will chose 
to join the riot. This results in a group coordinating to full riot equilibrium.  
The purpose of including the threshold model in the Riot Threshold Model is 
to provide a sufficient condition for action. This model focuses on the decision-
making process that each separate individual conducts when evaluating their options. 
An individual sees if their threshold requirement is satisfied and then evaluates if 
their net benefits outweigh their net costs. In this manner, Granovetter’s Threshold 
Model expresses how a riot is initiated and then evolves.  
From rational choice theory, we would expect the individuals who choose to 
riot to always hold the preference to riot. Furthermore, the only reason they do not 
riot each day is because they require coordination to do so. This advocates that rioters 
do not regret their decision to participate in the long-run and accept the costs of 
public destruction. One possible reason this may not be the case is that a potential 
participant experiences a sufficient level of stress which would alter their cost and 
benefit analysis, allowing the individual to later regret their actions. Therefore it can 
be said that after it is expressed how a riot could be evaluated as well as how the riot 
develops, there remains the final inquiry of how the choice to join the riot could be 
(7) 
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deemed as rational when all long-run costs and benefits are taken into account, since 
evaluators are assumed to possess perfect information. A riddle that can be solved by 
introducing the differences between intuitive and deliberate thinking and hence the 
dual processes of thought. It is here we discuss the preferences of action versus the 
coordinating mechanisms and expectations that are essential to the Riot Threshold 
Model. 
2.6 DUAL-PROCESSING MODEL AND THE RIOT THRESHOLD MODEL 
The dual-processing model comes from “the ancient idea that cognitive 
processes can be partitioned into two main families traditionally called intuition and 
reason” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005, p. 267).” A number of dual-processing 
models have been explored and implemented throughout economic, psychology and 
neuroscience studies (Sanfey et al, 2006, p. 114) (Camerer et al, 2005) (Evans, 2008; 
2007; 2006). These models have their foundations in empirical research. As in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983), subjects consistently made a basic logical fallacy, the 
conjunction error. The authors concluded in this study that “the conjunction error 
demonstrates with exceptional clarity the contrast between the extensional logic that 
underlies most formal conceptions of probability and the natural assessments that 
govern many judgments and beliefs” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 43). In other 
words, error highlights the existence of deliberate as well as intuitive reasoning. This 
certainty of the existence of simultaneous dual-processing is echoed throughout a 
variety of other works. It should be noted that there is currently research being 
conducted to investigate if there are in fact more than two processes, but the 
existence of at least two remains a certainty (Stanovich, 2009). 
Two dual-processing models which have been particularly instrumental to this 
study are Thaler and Shefrin’s Planner-Doer Model (1981) and Kahneman and 
Frederick’s Dual-Processing Model (2005). It was Thaler and Shefrin’s Model which 
guided this study towards the idea that a dual process model could present the key to 
explaining a rioter’s actions (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). The Planner-Doer Model 
verifies how “the idea of self-control is paradoxical unless it is assumed that the 
psyche contains more than one energy system, and that these energy systems have 
some degree of independence from each other” (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981, p. 393-94). 
Their model reveals how an individual “at any point in time” possesses a planner and 
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a doer. It underlines how “the planner is concerned with lifetime utility, while the 
doer exists only for one period and is completely selfish, or myopic” (Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981, p. 394). These connections are vital for solving the mystery of why 
potential participants engage in behavior that may seem immediately gratifying and 
utility seeking, when the aftermath is taxing in the long-run not only to themselves 
but their communities as well. This in turn provides the first indication that a rioter 
does not lack perfect information but an inability to consider all the information 
available to them. It also introduces a way for a rioter to be rational and yet capable of 
not fully understanding or even regretting their choice to participate in the long-run. 
Thaler and Shefrin’s Planner-Doer Model requires additional information if it 
is to demonstrate how the separation between planner and doer occurs. A 
requirement filled by the Dual-Processing Model of Kahneman and Frederick (2005). 
The dual-processing model can be linked to the planner and doer in Thaler and 
Shefrin’s model by connecting the planner with system 2 processing and the doer 
with system 1 processing. This is supportable by the sufficient similarities between 
the reasoning planner and instinctual doer to the intuitive system 1 and the deliberate 
system 2.  
This study follows the terminology of “system 1” and “system 2” from 
Stanovich and West (2002), Kahneman and Frederick (2005) and others, as seen in 
Evans (2008). It should be taken into account, as it is in Kahneman and Frederick 
(2005), that the term “system” is simply used as “a label for collections of cognitive 
processes that can be distinguished by their speed, their controllability, and the 
contents on which they operate” (p. 267). As described by the psychologists Overton 
and Ricco (2010), the dual processes consist of the procedural system 1 and the 
competent system 2. System 1 is highly dependent on a decision’s context, which 
comes from “both the competence system and informational inputs” (Overton & 
Ricco, 2010, p. 233). It utilizes procedure as a means to an end or goal and is 
generally efﬁcient, relatively automatic, fast and preconscious. System 2 is generally 
characterized as a “normative, abstract, idealized, dynamic model of the operations of 
the mind” which is “relatively enduring, universal, and applicable to a broad range of 
phenomena” (p. 232). This system is ﬂexible, effortful, slow, and considered to be 
“the relatively conscious nature of competence processing” (p. 232). In action, system 
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1 quickly produces intuitive answers to questions and problems as they arise. System 
2 then screens the quality of these proposals, which it may “endorse, correct, or 
override” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005, p. 268) In other words, system 2 is present 
“to overcome the impulses of system 1,” giving it charge over self-control (Kahneman, 
2011, Kindle Loc. 469-70).  
Kahneman (2003) outlines how the preferences of System 1 and System 2 are 
not always in line. Kahneman demonstrates how this is due to the fact that the 
“preferences that are controlled by the emotion of the moment” cannot be expected to 
be “internally coherent, or even reasonable by the cooler criteria of reflective 
reasoning” (2003, p. 1463). Therefore, an important aspect of the dual-processing 
model is that it demonstrates how one individual can simultaneously have two sets of 
preferences for one situation. The ultimate decision of the individual then becomes 
dependent on whether their decision-making process is currently dominated by 
system 1 or system 2 processing. One reason for a decision-making process to be 
dominated by one system versus the other is the presence of a sufficient level of 
stress. It is the supportable assumption of this study that a riot poses a sufficiently 
stressful environment which then in turn alters cognitive abilities. This is further 
discussed in Claim 1 of the following section, The Model Meets the Riot. It is 
moreover possible to introduce that a riot is capable of lowering cognitive abilities to 
a level where the decision-making process of a potential rioter becomes dominated by 
system 1 processing.  
Now that the pivotal role of dual-processing in the decision-making process 
has been introduced, this work wishes to exhibit one way for the dual-processing 
model to be incorporated in the cost benefit-analysis of the rational potential rioter. 
This is done with the intention of explaining why many participants hold a preference 
to participate in the short-run, which they then later regretted in the long-run. This 
change in preferences can be found in multiple stories of regret and remorse among 
the firsthand accounts of the participants of the 2011 London Riots (R.C. & V.P., 2011; 
2012).  
The variables in the private interest equation of the Riot Threshold Model can 
be divided into two groups of variables. These groups are based on how an individual 
assesses the different variables within the equation. Some variables are assessed with 
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intuitive processing while others demand more deliberate processing for accurate 
assessment. The variables that can be weighed by intuitive processing are defined as 
system 1 variables while the variables assessed by deliberate processing are defined as 
system 2 variables. Elements that are beneficial to an individual are assessed 
intuitively, while costs require deliberate assessment (Kahneman, 2003; 2011). The 
variables of the private interest equation can therefore be divided and defined in the 
following manner: 
        
                    
                         
The beneficial variables designated to system 1 are defined as such because they stem 
from processes that are completed “automatically and quickly, with little or no effort 
and no sense of voluntary control” (Kahneman, 2011, Kindle Loc. 358-59). The cost 
variables in system 2 are defined as such because they are “associated with the 
subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration” as well as “effortful 
mental activities,” “including complex computations” (Kahneman, 2011, Kindle Loc. 
360-61). It is important to note that the dual-processing model disregards that   and 
   are dependent on n. 
Now that the variables have been separated and defined as system 1 and 
system 2 variables, the Model can devise how an individual’s cost-benefit analysis 
depends on whether an individual is operating in system 1 or system 2 dominated 
processing. The case that this study is most concerned with is when a decision is 
dominated by system 1 processing. System 1 dominated processing can be shown as 
occurring when: 
                 
Demonstrating that when a decision is dominated by system 1 processing, that the 
variables attributed to system 1 are greater than the variables of system 2. 
In order to represent the effect of a shift from a system 1 dominated process to 
a system 2, the two groups of variables are each given a weight. These weights are 
(8) 
(9) 
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strictly positive and the sum of the two weights represents the full abilities of the 
individual’s cognitive processing. Each weight is to mirror the proportion of an 
individual’s full processing abilities that is being utilized by that system. For example, 
if the brain is primarily processing intuitive information, system 1 processing would 
dominate. In this case, the weight of system 1 would be expected to be greater than 
the system 2 weight.  
The weight placed on system 1 is represented by   and the system 2 weight is 
represented by  . As noted above, the full processing capabilities of an individual is 
represented by      . While 
 
 
 is a function increasing in n that represents a 
sufficient level of stress.  The weights of system 1 and system 2 in private interest 
equation can therefore be represented by the following:  
    (     )   (        ) 
At this juncture, the current expected number of participants is not included in 
the equation in order to highlight the value of the weights to the potential rioter’s 
analysis. If the individual’s choice to riot is to be defined as a rational decision, the 
weighted private interest equation for participation must be strictly positive,  
 (     )   (        )    
 
 
 
 
 
(     )  (      )    
The goal of a utility maximizer can then be simplified to one of maximizing the 
sum of emotional benefit and private revenue. Shown as, 
 
 
(     )  (      ) 
When the threshold requirement is included it yields the following condition for 
participation, 
 
 
( )(     )  (      ) 
The threshold requirement can then be defined implicitly as, 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(15) 
(14) 
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 (  
 )(     )         
The inclusion of separate weights of system 1 and 2 allows for the evaluation of 
system 2 costs, such as destroyed buildings, the loss of infrastructure and a lack of 
psychological stability, to carry a separate weight from that of system 1 benefits. 
These weights illustrate how the net gain from participation in the current time 
period is less than the net gain from participation in the time period immediately 
after the riot when processing is dominated by system 1. In sum, this provides a 
possible explanation for a difference in a rioter’s preferences in the short-run and the 
long-run, while holding that the individual is acting rational at the time of decision.  
2.7 THE ROLE OF STRESS IN THE RIOT THRESHOLD MODEL 
A study of firsthand accounts from the 2011 London Riots as well as 
psychological and neurological studies suggests that a leading cause for the 
dominance of system 1 processing in a potential rioter’s decision-making process is 
the presence a sufficient level of stress in the individual’s environment. The results of 
this study are explored below. The shift from system 2 to system 1 dominated 
processing is in part due to the ability of a sufficient level of stress to reduce and bind 
cognitive abilities to system 1. This shift can be reflected in the weighted private 
interest equation seen in the previous section. It can be said that when an individual 
experiences a sufficient level of stress that the weight of system 2 processing,  , 
decreases as the weight of system 1 processing   increases. Each weight is continuous 
and becomes a function of the level of stress that the individual experiences. It should 
be noted that whether it is possible for   to equal 0 is for another study.   
Due to limited system 2 processing, a sufficient level of stress alters the 
potential participants’ evaluation of costs and benefit. The outcome is that the net 
gain of participation appears greater in the short-run than in the long-run. Benefits 
such as private revenue and emotional benefit are instantly obtainable and become of 
crucial importance in the moment. However costs such as potential penalties, injury 
and personal cost are typically perceived with limited awareness. This in turn imparts 
a short-sidedness in the individual’s decision-making process and cost-benefit 
analysis for participation. Furthermore, participants are likely to regret or not fully 
understand their actions in the post-riot period after the costs are fully realized. 
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It is important to note that a number of factors outside of a sufficient level of 
stress can cause the shift from system 2 to system 1 dominated processing. Stressors 
in an individual’s environment are highlighted in this study as the source of this 
restriction because they are deemed to be the leading and most influential source of 
the shift in the case of riots. However, additional causes may exist and be of 
noteworthy importance. The primary concern of this work is that a shift is possible, 
and therefore that the decision-making process has the capacity to be limited to the 
intuitive system 1 by some source. The limitation to the decision-making process and 
hence the short-sidedness of the cost-benefit analysis is what is essential to the Riot 
Threshold Model. It is assumed that any factor which affects the balance between 
intuitive and deliberate processing would produce a similar effect on the private 
interest equation and support the model. The discovery of the origins of the root 
cause can therefore be seen as a secondary concern, as it is not indispensable to the 
model. However, the crediting of the role of stress in the decision-making process is 
undertaken in this study because of its contribution to understanding of a riot.  
The firsthand accounts of participants from the 2011 London Riots, such as 
those provided by the government sponsored Riot Communities & Victims Panel 
report (2011), reflect that stress leads to limited cognition. However, this fact also 
finds support in the basic composition of the brain itself (Hammond, 2000) (LeDoux, 
1996). Studies have established a physical connection between the rise of emotions in 
individuals, as seen in the rioters of London, and their ability to make decisions. A 
study quoted by Hammond and done by the neuroscientists Lazarus and Lazarus 
(1994) found “that emotion and reason are interdependent” and that it is when an 
individual experiences an emotion that the mind fixates its attention on coping with 
the task or emergency at hand, which in turn limits the individual’s view of the long-
run (Lazarus and Lazarus, 1994, p. 179 as quoted by Hammond, 2000, p. 23). 
Kahneman is united with these findings and underlines that “intense focusing on a 
task can make people effectively blind, even to stimuli that normally attract 
attention...we become not only “blind to the obvious,” but also “blind to our 
blindness” (2011, Kindle Loc. 418, 428).  
Once an individual’s cognitive functions become “overloaded” as stressors 
continue to grow and multiply, the individual’s processing speed lowers (Thompson, 
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2010). The brain’s ability to retrieve information becomes increasingly difficult and 
slower until the accuracy of the information being retrieved becomes questionable. At 
this point, “thinking itself becomes a chore; and it becomes difficult to maintain 
focus, clarity, and the motivation to continue” (Thompson, 2010, Kindle Loc. 2653-
55).  As the stress level surges, a “notable decline” occurs in the individual’s ability “to 
process complex information and handle ambiguity” (Thompson, 2010, Kindle Loc. 
2663-64). The individual’s cognitive intelligence then “tends to take on a more 
concrete and short-term perspective” (Kindle Loc. 2665-68). The individual’s long-
term planning capabilities are “lost with increased stress.” Furthermore, as the level 
of stress increases from low to moderate to sufficiently high, “time horizons continue 
to become shorter” until the individual is only functioning in and focusing on the 
“now” (Kindle Loc. 2665-2668). In other words, “the balanced blend of cognitive and 
emotional intelligences begins to shift toward decisions that are emotionally driven” 
(Kindle Loc. 2715-16).  
Outside the framework of stress, the intuitive system 1 “has the ability to 
transmit signals almost four times as fast” as system 2 (Thompson, 2010, Kindle Loc. 
2718-27). Without the control and intervention of the deliberate system 2, “the 
emotion center can operate at full speed” and “the emotion center begins to operate 
on automatic pilot” (Kindle Loc. 2718-27). Intuitive decisions are left uncontested 
and “previous decisions and data that have been emotionally tagged or primed” now 
appear to be the best alternative (Kindle Loc. 2718-27). As “everything becomes short 
term, with little consideration for unintended consequences,” there is an increasing 
probability of the individual making a less effective decision compared to when 
system 2 is fully active” (Kindle Loc. 2718-27).  
The importance of the role of stress is supported by further psychological and 
neurological studies. A number of studies demonstrate how an individual’s use of 
more demanding cognitive processing is severely limited under the sway of stress 
(Slovic et al, 1974) (Hammond, 2000) (Maule & Hockey, 1993). Evidence from 
multiple previous studies indicate that situations which carry high levels of stress or 
“high levels of emotional intensity block access to short-term memory, disorganize 
logical or inferential thought processes, cause loss of control of body parts and 
functions,” which in turn create physical manifestations of stress such as trembling 
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hands, nausea or headaches (Kaufman, 1999, p. 139). Perhaps most importantly, 
situations of great intensity have the ability to “block out rational considerations of 
benefit and cost, and promote acts of aggression and violence” (Levitt, 1980; 
Idzikowski and Baddeley, 1983; Lane, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley, 1992 as cited by 
Kaufman, 1999, p. 139).  
A selective review of development research studying children’s performance in 
judgment and decision tasks by Haines and Moore (2003) found that more 
sophisticated reasoning, such as system 2 processing, is more likely to occur in 
situations of “social and interpersonal domains” (p. 227). These situations are 
typically of high personal relevance where task difficulty is low, the individual is 
highly familiar with the situation and peer or cultural norms encourage the individual 
towards task engagement (2003). It can be said that a riot does not reflect this type of 
environment. A riot does however reflect a situation where “less complex, script-
based processing,” such as system 1, is dominate. Haines and Moore (2003) 
illustrates how the entire population, including the very young is effected by dual-
processing. Giving explanation to the age span of participants in the 2011 London 
Riots, since the youngest person to be arrested was only ten years old at the time 
(R.C. & V.P., 2011). 
In sum, this survey of psychological and neurological studies supports the 
theory that when an individual is under stress, their decision-making process is 
dominated by system 1 due to the restriction of system 2 processing. Furthermore, 
when there is an absence of stress or other limitations the individual has the 
capability of utilizing both system 1 and system 2 processing (Hammond, 2000) 
(Slovic et al, 1974) (Toates, 1995).  
The importance of the role of stress on the decision-making process suggests 
that a potential participant’s cost-benefit analysis is significantly swayed by the 
stressors produced by the riot. As seen throughout the survey, when a sufficient level 
of stress is present the brain is captivated by system 1, intuitive thinking. While an 
insufficient level of stress allows the system 2 processing to fully operate, which in 
turn allows system 2 to dominate. The time periods before, during and after the riot 
can therefore be seen as periods corresponding to insufficient or sufficient levels of 
stress and thus system 1 or system 2 dominance. The period before and up to the 
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moment the riot begins has increasing but insufficient levels of stress. The period 
during the riot begins with increasingly sufficient levels of stress, which then turns to 
decreasingly sufficient levels as the riot decreases in magnitude. The period after and 
at the moment the riot ceases continues with decreasing but insufficient levels of 
stress. These periods in turn correspond to system 1 and system 2 processing. It is 
therefore useful to view the lifespan of a riot in terms of the level of stress it produces 
over time. This is illustrated in Figure 2.  
The dominance of system 1 processing under a sufficient level of stress during 
a riot causes the potential participant to focus primarily on short-run costs and 
benefits and discount long-run costs such as damages to infrastructure or future tax 
increases exacted in order to pay for repairs. In other words, as the level of stress an 
individual experiences increases, the costs of participation will decrease. For clarity, 
the term ‘short-run’ is used and defined as the moment that an event can be seen as a 
riot by a potential participant and all moments thereafter were the riot exists. In 
other words, the short-run includes all moments where the current level of stress 
affecting the evaluator is greater than or equal to the sufficient level of stress. 
Similarly, the term ‘long-run’ is defined as the moment that and all moments 
thereafter that the riot ceases to exist and the sufficient level of stress no longer 
affects the individual. 
The connection between system 1 processing and a focus on the short-run as 
well as between system 2 processing and a focus on the long-run then suggests the 
following: 
                                                          
                                                              
The current level of stress is represented by the system 1 weight,  . The sufficient 
level of stress caused by a riot is then represented by   . The level of stress produced 
by the environment is continuous, increasing as the riot grows and then decreasing as 
it dissolves.   
(16) 
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Figure. 2.   The lifespan of a riot defined in terms of the level of stress it produces 
 The current expected number of participants must be sufficiently high for the 
potential participant to consider it a riot, the environment being of a riotous nature 
then brings about a sufficient level of stress. In this way, it can be said that the costs 
are decreasing in   as well as decreasing in n. In a similar way, benefits are 
increasing in   as well as increasing in n. The connection between stress and the 
number of participants is therefore highlighted. The premises that costs are 
decreasing and benefits increasing remain the same, however there are now two 
possible explanations for the changes in perceived costs and benefit. To a certain 
extent, it is not possible to discriminate between the two models for the reasoning 
behind an individual having a particular preference. Both promote the importance of 
the aggregation of individual’s decisions. Since both of these explanations provide a 
similar result, they can be said to be two separate reasons or they can be defined as 
interconnected. However, it seems to be in greater accordance with firsthand 
accounts as well as the literature to say that both the expected number of participants 
and the level of stress have a joined and compounding effect on a potential rioter’s 
analysis for participation.  
The conclusion of the Riot Threshold Model is that a potential rioter will 
choose to engage in a riot when both their necessary and sufficient conditions are 
satisfied. The necessary condition being that the benefits from participation are 
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strictly greater than the costs. The sufficient condition is that the expected number of 
current participants is greater than or equal to the evaluator’s threshold requirement.  
The costs and benefits from participation are affected by the current expected 
number of rioters and the individual’s dual-processing system being dominated by 
system 1. The expected number of participants effects costs and benefits during both 
the short and long-run while the dominance of system 1 processing only affects 
perceived costs and benefits during the riot state, when a sufficient level of stress is 
present. The end decision for participation is motivated by a desire to optimize the 
individual’s utility. Therefore, decision to riot can be defined as a rational choice. In 
this way, the “stripping of the ‘veneer’ of civilization” and appearance of the 
maddening crowd in previous collective action theories can be shown as not a 
maddening, but a result of a rational choice (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1421). 
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3 The Model Meets the Riot 
 
The Riot Threshold Model is based on theory, however it can be supported and 
mirrored in the events of the 2011 London Riots. It is for this reason that a selection 
of stories has been chosen in order to provide poignant examples of how the model is 
applicable to real world events, and to the London Riots in particular. 
The supporting evidence presented here has been taken from government 
24sponsored research, news articles, a book and even a blog. These quotes are taken 
from the largest collection of data that was possible to gather within the time limits of 
this work. Every attempt has been made to present the most accurate picture of the 
riots as possible. However, it should be kept in mind that some of these quotes are 
from subjective firsthand accounts. Many are not the result of empirical studies and 
nearly all are quantitative in nature. It should furthermore be mentioned that these 
quotes are highly selective and that no individual interviews were conducted. The 
selectivity is due to the fact that the collection here could only be taken from the 
accounts made available by government, media and additional sources. Nonetheless 
even with these considerations in mind, the consistent echoing of the Riot Threshold 
Model in the firsthand accounts proved to be a strong base of support for the model’s 
applicability and fit. In the end, the number of accounts gathered as well as the 
degree of correlation between the model and the accounts prove sufficient to address 
concerns of a selection bias. 
This section of the study is organized in the form of presenting a claim derived 
from the Riot Threshold Model, which is then followed by support for that claim in 
form of a discussion followed by related quotations from the collection of accounts 
from the 2011 London Riots. 
3.1 A RIOT AS A SUFFICIENT LEVEL OF STRESS 
CLAIM:  Decisions made during a riot are made under a sufficient level of stress.  
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SUPPORT:  
In the moment that n becomes sufficiently high so that the individual 
performing the analysis deems the conflict to be a ‘riot,’ it can be said that the conflict 
is a sufficiently stressful environment and that the individual is experiencing a 
sufficient level of stress. A riot is a sufficiently stressful environment that can be 
compared with a problematic situation that “is perceived as one for which coping 
resources are not available” (Maule & Hockey, 1993, p. 91). According to Maule and 
Hockey, this atmosphere is very likely to result in “reduced effectiveness” and 
produces “the physiological, psychological, and behavioral symptoms of stress” (1993, 
p. 91). The sources of stress which stem from a riot environment are among some of 
the top stressors that the human body can experience. A few examples of the sources 
of stress that are present during a riot can be found in the following List 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The stressors of the riot cause physiological effects throughout the entire body 
of the individuals they affect (Toates, 2005). Some of the most common, as well as 
easily detected physical signs include increased heart rate, blood pressure, blood 
sugar, perspiration and respiration (Aldwin, 2009). The significance of this is that the 
presence of stress can be documented in a potential rioter by citing and measuring 
the physical manifestations of stress exhibited by the individual.  
List. 1. Sources of Stress 
1. Fear of crime, confrontation or threat  
2. Physical hazards such as fire 
3. Perceived loss of control  
4. Lack of public or private transportation, leading to a 
feeling of one being trapped 
5. Loud noises 
6. Time constraints on the decision-making process 
(Toates, 2005) (Hammond, 2000) 
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The strength of these stressors over the individual is particularly strong during 
a riot due to the increased frequency and scale at which they occur (Toates, 2005). 
Furthermore, since many of these stressors are considered uncontrollable, they are 
generally more distressing than those that are more likely to be under an individual’s 
control (Aldwin, 2009). Since many of the stressors in a riot situation are seen as 
uncontrollable, this amplifies the stress it imparts to the individual. The power of 
these stressors supports Watts (2011) which states that “riots have a primal energy of 
their own that can undermine otherwise strong social conventions against physical 
destruction, even skewing our psychological estimation of risk. In a riot, even sensible 
people can go crazy” (Kindle Loc. 1077-78). The effects of these stressors are 
demonstrated in the stories below. 
The strength of these effects also shows that individuals are capable of 
assessing the act of participation differently under the influence of stress. The 
difference in an individual’s evaluation under sufficient stress suggests that 
individuals are capable of not fully understanding, or even regretting, their actions 
once the level of stress has decreased. This is likewise reflected in the firsthand 
accounts provided below. 
STORY 1 [Journalist’s account]: There were “scenes of people looting, vandalising, 
thieving, robbing, scenes of people attacking police officers and even attacking fire 
crews as they're trying to put out fires.” (Quinn & Adams, 2011) 
STORY 2 [Journalist’s account]: The force of the riot and the swiftness by which it 
grew is reflected in law enforcement’s response to the riots, “The police force found 
themselves completely blown away by the number and persistence of the rioters.” 
(Quinn & Adams, 2011) 
STORY 3 [Journalist’s account]: There were multiple accounts of “buses [that] were 
stopped and abandoned.” Some buses were even set on fire (Gabbatt & Adams, 2011). 
STORY 4 [Personal account in Government sponsored research]: “It was literally a 
moment of madness. (Young person, in custody)” (Morrell et al, 2011, p. 29) 
STORY 5 [Personal account in Government sponsored research]: “It was a stupid 
mistake. I was just acting hard.” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 66) 
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STORY 6 [Personal account in Government sponsored research]: “I just got carried 
away.” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 66) 
STORY 7 [Personal account in Government sponsored research]:  “It was the heat of 
the moment.” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 66) 
STORY 8 [Personal account in Government sponsored research]: “It was like 
something out of a zombie movie.” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 49) 
STORY 9 [Personal account in Government sponsored research]: “There were large 
numbers of people involved, not just kids but adults too. They looked like zombies, it 
was just mad...Some people didn’t plan their involvement; they just got swept along 
with the crowd. It was shocking how it got out of hand so quickly and the police 
struggled to control things.” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 49) 
3.2 EFFECTS OF A RIOTOUS ENVIRONMENT ON PRIVATE INTEREST 
EQUATION  
CLAIM: An individual’s evaluation of each variable within the private interest 
equation is affected by the riotous environment.  
SUPPORT: 
The following selection of stories are intended to illuminate how each variable 
in the Riot Threshold Model’s private interest equation was evaluated by participants 
and observers during the 2011 London Riots. Stories are provided for each variable in 
order to show how a riotous environment as well as the number of participants 
influences that specific variable. 
3.2.1 INCREASED VALUE OF PRIVATE REVENUE OR REWARD 
STORY 1 [Journalist’s account]: “Another youth, a young man, when asked why he 
was participating replied in a manner that reflected what many were doing that day, 
"Why are you going to miss the opportunity to get free stuff that's worth loads of 
money?" Furthermore, when he was “pressed on why he was stealing stuff he could 
afford, he went to blame the abolition of the education maintenance grant: "It's not 
about that. It's about the government. No kids don't want to go to college no more coz 
they don't get paid."” (Williams, 2011)  
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STORY 2 [Journalist’s account]: “…it remains the case that these are shopping riots, 
characterised by their consumer choices.” (Williams, 2011) 
STORY 3 [Journalist’s account]: As a woman in the London neighborhood of 
Hackney put it: "We're not all gathering together for a cause, we're running down 
Foot Locker." (Williams, 2011) 
STORY 4 [Journalist’s account]: “On Sunday morning, apparently, people had been 
not just looting H&M, but trying things on first. By Monday night, Debenhams in 
Clapham Junction was empty, and in a cheeky touch, the streets were thronging with 
people carrying Debenhams bags. Four hours before, I had still thought this was just 
a north London thing..” (Williams, 2011) 
3.2.2 LOWERED EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVATE PENALTY 
STORY 1 [Journalist’s account]: “The government aren't in control, if they was, we 
wouldn't be able to do it. They tried, they failed. How many people have they 
arrested? 10? I'm not bothered. I'll keep doing this every day til I get caught. Asked by 
Ravenscroft if he was worried about being arrested, he replies: This would be my first 
offence. I haven't been in trouble before, I'll take a caution. The prisons are 
overcrowded. What are they gonna do...?” (Quinn & Adams, 2011)  
STORY 2 [Personal Blog]: Written about an area where the looting had just begun: 
“On to the looters. A lot of them (more than half by my estimates) didn't bother to 
hide their faces. I don't know if this was down to bravado or stupidity, but also maybe 
because there were no police in sight and no media, although I suspect there is plenty 
of CCTV around there.” (Motown’s Blog, 2011) 
STORY 3 [Journalist’s account]: “London's police chief has admitted with hindsight 
he wished he had more officers on the streets at the height of last month's riots and 
the scale of the disorder "took us by surprise.” (Sky News, 2011) 
STORY 4 [Journalist’s account]: “Amid the first signs of strains within the coalition 
over the response to the riots, government sources said the prime minister has called 
for an early assessment of the decision to increase police numbers in the capital from 
6,000 to 16,000.” (Quinn & Adams, 2011) 
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STORY 5 [Journalist’s account]: Some individuals did not stop their looting activities 
even when faced with an observer who declined to riot and choose to try to interfere 
or reprimand the individual. These stories are a clue to the strength of the 
individual’s view of their current environment and even to the strength of the stress 
that affected them. Few attempts were made to interfere or halt the illegal actions 
that occurred during the London Riots. The accounts recorded included verbal 
scoldings typically given by women. In fact, the attempts caught on tape gained 
considerable notoriety. The story of one such scolding was reported in the news as 
follows: 
 “When another group finished ransacking a pawnbroker's and started 
cleaning out a local fashion boutique, an angry young black woman berated 
one of them.” You're taking the piss, man. That woman hand-stitches 
everything, she's built that shop up from nothing. It's like stealing from your 
mum." A girl holding a looted wedding dress smiled sheepishly, stuck for 
anything to say.” (Lewis and Harkin, 2011) 
3.2.3 LOWERED PERCEPTION OF POTENTIAL INJURY 
STORY 1 [Journalist’s account]: “There seems to be another aspect to the impunity – 
that the people rioting aren't taking seriously the idea it could rebound on them.” 
(Williams, 2011)   
3.2.4 HEIGHTENED EMOTIONAL BENEFIT 
STORY 1 [Academic paper]: “For others, the riot atmosphere simply provides an 
opportunity to escape boredom and readily achieve adventure and thrilling 
experiences.” (Lachman, 1996, p. 743) 
STORY 2 [Journalist’s account]: “Fox said the riots seemed nihilistic, they didn't 
seem to be politically motivated, nor did they have any sense of community or social 
solidarity. This was inarguable.” (Williams, 2011) 
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3.2.5 LOWERED PERCEPTION OF  COST OF TIME AND OTHER RESOURCES 
STORY 1 [Academic paper]: A riot may present “an opportunity for acquiring 
personal goods (dinnerware, clothing, appliances, etc.) with minimum expenditure of 
resources and energy and with minimum likelihood of negative consequences” in the 
short-run (Lachman, 1996, p. 743). 
STORY 2 [Government sponsored research]: “Many shops were subsequently looted, 
but in other cases, windows were simply smashed indiscriminately.” (R.C. & V.P., 
2011, p. 26) 
3.3 GOAL OF THE RIOT 
CLAIM: Participants did not see the 2011 London Riots as means for achieving a goal. 
SUPPORT:  
The diversity of the people involved and the lack of objective among them are 
perhaps two of the more astonishing characteristics of the 2011 London Riots. 
Accounts are plentiful of people standing by trying to decide if they would join, 
defend or simply observe the acts of thievery and destruction going on around them.  
The lack of a central goal within these accounts is only more surprising when it is 
considered that one clear objective or motivation is an attribute that is nearly always 
associated with aggravated collective action. This lack of intention marks a separation 
from standard sociological theories on collective action, and more importantly takes 
away the possibility that the act of rioting stemmed from a sense of duty or a desire to 
accomplish a goal. The significance of this is that it permits the decision for 
participation to stay within the confines of a cost and benefit analysis that excludes 
concerns for the public good. 
STORY 1 [Government sponsored research]: “There was no single cause of the riots 
and no single group was responsible.” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 55) 
STORY 2 [Journalist’s account]: “Take events in Chalk Farm, north London. First the 
streets contained people of all backgrounds sprinting off with bicycles looted from 
Evans Cycles. Three Asian men in their 40s, guarding a newsagent, discussed 
whether they should also take advantage of the apparent suspension of law. "If we go 
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for it now, we can get a bike," said one. "Don't do it," said another. Others were not so 
reticent; a white woman and a man emerged carrying a bike each. A young black 
teenager, aged about 14, came out smiling, carrying another bike, only for it [to] be 
snatched from him by an older man. They were just some of the crowd of about 100 
who had gathered on the corner; a mix of the curious and angry, young and old. It 
was impossible to distinguish between thieves, bystanders and those who simply 
wanted to cause damage”…“Most of those he was filming had covered their faces. One 
had a full balaclava with holes cut out only for the eyes and mouth. "Is that you, 
‘bruv’?" an older man, aged about 30, hands in pockets, asked the man in the 
balaclava. Recognising his friend, he laughed and added: "Fuck. Don't stand near me 
– you're going to get me arrested." (Lewis and Harkin, 2011) 
STORY 3 [Report commissioned by the Cabinet Office]: “People use the cover of the 
crowd to do stuff that they would never have the ‘bottle’ to do as an individual, but 
when they were in that crowd they felt they had the power to do it, they had the 
mentality, they were willing to take a step further.” - Temporary Assistant 
Commissioner, Chris Allison, Metropolitan Police (Challenger, Clegg & Robinson, 
2009, p. 65) 
3.4 COORDINATION IN THE RIOT 
CLAIM: There was no extensive deliberate coordination among the participants of 
the riots. 
SUPPORT: 
 In the case of the London Riots, the decision to riot seems to be free from 
extensive deliberate coordination or the influence of groupthink which leads to 
conformity and the collective denial of the reality of the destruction caused by a riot 
(Bénabou, 2009). Groupthink, in its most basic form, is defined as “a pattern of 
thought characterized by self-deception, forced manufacture of consent, and 
conformity to group values and ethics” (Bénabou, 2009, p. 1). The lack of influence 
from groupthink is further supported by empirical findings, which establish that 
there is little evidence that stress in the form of adversity to a group causes 
groupthink (Turner & Horvitz, 2001). Accounts of the riot also show that the actions 
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of rioters were free of extensive deliberate coordination in the sense that not all 
participants were acting towards a common goal or in an ordered fashion. The 
number of other participants currently rioting influenced potential participants’ 
decision to join, but it did not influence how they acted after they decided to 
participate. In other words, the most important factor to the potential participant’s 
analysis was not what others were doing in the riot, but only if others were active in 
the riot.   
Most news accounts reported the appearance of a certain degree of 
coordination as several people appeared in the same place at the same time. 
However, it can be said that this is greater evidence of similar preferences for goods 
than of deliberate coordination. There were also a number of accounts of some 
coordination in regards to watching for “the Feds” and any local residents who might 
attempt to prevent or stop the looting of a particular shop. However, there is little to 
no evidence of individuals or groups extensively coordinating these efforts (Lewis and 
Harkin, 2011). In fact there is little evidence that individuals acted as simple groups 
for more than one particular looting or act of destruction. Incidents where large 
groups appeared and grew in one area was often due to the access to the same 
information by way of social or mainstream media on what areas where more 
vulnerable as well as similarities in preferences for certain goods. For instance, goods 
that were expensive or easily obtainable were targeted with higher frequency (R.C. & 
V.P., 2011). This is once again more likely to be due to preferences towards areas of 
lower risk for private penalty than the outcome of deliberate coordination. 
Furthermore, reports such as Halliday (2011) confirm that access to the same 
information through social media, and tools such as BlackBerry Messenger, increased 
the ease of looting but that it was not the root cause.  
STORY 1 [Personal account in Government sponsored research]: “They attacked their 
own- we're not rich." (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 56) 
STORY 2 [Book on the riots]: The magnitude of the events were then amplified by the 
Blackberry Messenger and social networking sites like Twitter, “without which the 
riots would still have occurred” (Bev, 2011, Kindle Loc. 39-44, 58-63).  
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STORY 3 [Journalist’s account]: “But there was no rush; the group knew from 
experience that police would hold back for the time being. “Keep an eye on the Feds, 
man,” said one youth. Overheard snippets of conversation gave an insight into how 
the disparate groups were deciding where to go. One man said: “Hampstead, ‘bruv.’ 
Let's go rob Hampstead.” Another, looking at his BlackBerry, said: “Kilburn, it's 
happening in Kilburn and Holloway.” A third added: “The whole country is burning, 
man.”” (Lewis and Harkin, 2011) 
3.5 LONG-RUN COSTS OF THE RIOT 
CLAIM: The total costs of the riots outweigh the total benefits for participants in the 
long-run. 
SUPPORT:  
As the number of participants compounded among the crowds, so did looting, 
arson and vandalism. These actions appeared rational in the short term, as benefits of 
expressing and releasing pint-up emotions and private revenue seem to outweigh the 
potential costs of the moment. The sense of opportunism that was felt in the air only 
encouraged the desire for the benefits of participation. Accounts show that it was as if 
everyone was asking the same question a young boy had, “Why are you going to miss 
the opportunity to get free stuff that's worth loads of money?" even if they could 
afford the items being stolen (Williams, 2011) (Lachman, 1996). However, it is when 
these actions are viewed in the long-run that it becomes clear that the total costs of 
the riots will outweigh the benefits for participants. The reason for this is that a long-
run analysis would be forced to include the cost of the extensive damages and equally 
sizable cost of repairs. When a group destroys its own neighborhood, it is in fact 
destroying its own economic infrastructure and future chances for employment along 
with it. The reports provided after the riots confirm due to the magnitude of the total 
costs of the riots, that the total personal benefits gained from participation cannot 
compete with the total costs. Therefore in the end, a deliberate cost-benefit analysis 
shows that costs outweigh the benefits of rioting. 
STORY 1 [Report commissioned by U.K. government]: A report conducted by the 
Riots Communities and Victims Panel estimated the following long-run costs for the 
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2011 London riots. In five days an estimated 13,000 to 15,000 participants caused an 
estimated 300 million pounds in damages to property, 43.5 million in clean-up costs, 
80 million in lost sales and 520 million in loss in tourism (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 32). 
The same report estimated the “final bill” to be “around half a billion pounds (plus 
impacts on tourism)” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 28). 
Key costs within the half a billion pounds include the following: “up to £300m claims 
under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886; £30m in recovery support funding including the 
High Street Support scheme; more than £30m in lost sales to retail businesses; costs 
to police of £50m (including overtime costs); and costs to local authorities including 
significant clean-up costs, running into tens of millions of pounds. 330,000 tourists 
have been predicted to go elsewhere, cutting tourism spending by £520m over the 
next 12 months…In London boroughs, which experienced widespread disorder, 
businesses reported a 50% loss of trade for the week following the riots. By mid-
September, trade was still down 20–30% and the Panel has heard from businesses 
across the country that trade remains down (for example, current trade in Tottenham 
is reported still to be 20–30% down). In some cases, this has led to businesses which 
existed on very low profit margins collapsing.” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 28) 
STORY 2 [Personal account in Government sponsored research]: “Lives were lost. 
Parents had to carry children out of burning homes leaving a lifetime of possessions 
behind to be destroyed. Shopkeepers lost everything they had built up over many 
years. Some were forced to sell their homes as they could no longer pay their bills.” 
(R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 56) 
STORY 3 [Government sponsored research]: “The extent of arson damage varied 
considerably. Tottenham and Croydon were particularly badly affected. In London 
alone, over 171 residential and 100 commercial buildings were affected by fire at a 
cost of millions of pounds. We heard numerous accounts of people escaping from 
burning premises. Several people were only saved through the intervention of their 
neighbours or landlords… As well as attacking firefighters trying to put out fires, 
some people taking part in the disturbances turned up at fire stations to prevent 
firefighters from going to emergency calls.” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 26)  
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STORY 4 [Journalist’s account]: “Shops and businesses around London closed early, 
fearing violence later.” (Quinn & Adams, 2011)   
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4 Discussion 
 
The following section constructs a deeper discussion on the importance of the 
threshold model and dual-processing models to the Riot Threshold Model. The role 
of each model in furthering the understanding of riotous collective behavior is 
articulated and fortified. The last of the discussion generates plausible adjustments to 
the private interest equation in the Riot Threshold Model. These potential 
modifications are included in order to strengthen and defend the structure of the 
current equation as well as to address why certain variables are not included.  
4.1 IMPORTANCE OF THE MECHANISMS IN THE THRESHOLD MODEL  
The inclusion of the mechanisms of Granovetter’s Threshold Model in the Riot 
Threshold Model is essential for providing an explanation of how a riot is initiated, as 
well as for defining a potential participant’s cost and benefits from participation. 
These mechanisms include the threshold requirement as well as the effect of the 
current population of rioters on the cost and benefits of participation. 
A cost-benefit analysis can demonstrate how an individual may choose to join 
a riot once the riot has already begun, but it cannot explain the first 'riotous' acts. The 
threshold model is “valuable in helping to understand situations where outcomes do 
not seem intuitively consistent with the underlying individual preferences” 
(Granovetter, 1978, p. 1441-42). The threshold model is therefore necessary in order 
to show how it all begins and how a crowd coordinates towards a full riot equilibrium 
versus a no riot equilibrium. Once an individual’s threshold requirement is satisfied, 
they are provided with a sufficient condition for participation. The participant will 
only cease riotous activity when the marginal benefit of participation does not 
outweigh the marginal cost. This explanation for a participant to cease their riotous 
activity once again demonstrates that the threshold requirement acts as a sufficient 
condition for rioting, while the cost-benefit analysis serves as a necessary condition. 
The first individuals to take action within a crowd do so within the framework 
of a small group where the riot has not yet begun. It can therefore be assumed that in 
those initial moments that the long-run costs will not appear as high as when the 
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action and population of rioters escalate. It can also be assumed that these 
individuals experience a sufficient emotional benefit from their current actions to 
outweigh what is perceived as the costs of their actions. An individual who is one of 
no more than a handful of persons will not have the same capacity for destruction. 
This small number of persons would only see the costs that they themselves are 
capable of producing. Furthermore, in their minds it would most likely seem more 
improbable than probable for their actions to escalate into something that could be 
defined as a riot. Operating purely selfishly, the consequences of their actions will not 
be a current concern. To them, they are only creating a 'little' havoc and producing 'a 
bit' of destruction.  
The Threshold Model shows how the action of this handful and their ‘bit’ of 
destruction tumbles into a full riot. As explained in the previous chapter, as these few 
begin, the required threshold of the next potential participant is satisfied, leading 
them to engage, which then satisfies the threshold of the subsequent person. This 
sequence continues until the riot has been born (Watts, 2011). As activity grows, each 
individual will look to their immediate surroundings to assess the number of current 
expected participants. This assessment is performed because the number of current 
participants affects the current costs and benefits of participation. As the riot grows 
in size, the potential for private penalty decreases which in turn increases the net 
gain. This is reflected in the Riots Communities and Victims Panel report covering 
the 2011 London Riot, which highlights that “the vast majority of people we spoke to 
believed that the sole trigger for trouble in their areas was a belief that the police 
could not contain the scale of rioting in Tottenham and then across London” (R.C. & 
V.P., 2011, p. 48). Therefore the development of a riot is dependent on this mutual 
contingency which is vital and produces “the chain reactions needed to get from one 
[non-riot] equilibrium” to a full riot equilibrium (Macy, 1991, p. 740).  These results 
are supported by the key findings of various extensive computer simulations (Macy, 
1991, p. 740).  
 Numerous interviews from those who set the riot into motion show that these 
individuals never dreamed that their actions would trigger or evolve into such 
widespread destruction. The surprise and remorse shown by the initial individuals is 
not only seen in the 2011 London Riots, but was also seen in the 1992 Los Angeles 
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Riots (R.C. & V.P., 2011) (Leithead, 2011). One original participant from the 1992 Los 
Angeles Riots is followed by regret for those actions, "sorry for what we did to this 
day" (Leithead, 2011). 
4.2 IMPORTANCE OF DUAL-PROCESSING MODEL  
The dual-processing model is a valuable aspect of the Riot Threshold Model. 
The long history of viewing the brain as divided between different types of processing 
provides a solid backbone for the inclusion of system 1 and system 2 when describing 
the human decision-making process (Koornstra, 2005). To reiterate, system 1 
operates automatically and rapidly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary 
control (Kahneman, 2011). In contrast, system 2 delegates focus to the effortful 
mental activities that require it, including complex computations” (Kahneman, 2011, 
Kindle Loc. 358-60).  
The dual-processing model provides additional explanation for individual 
rioter’s preferences, as well as a justification for why they choose to embark in riotous 
activities. It is especially useful in explaining the preferences of a rioter in conflicts 
where the long-run costs are considerable, such as in the case of the 2011 London 
Riots. According to the dual-processing model, a potential participant only 
experiences system 1 dominated processing once the riot has already begun. This is 
due to the fact that the presence of the riot is the source of the sufficient level of stress 
that binds the individual to system 1 processes. As previously discussed, those under 
the influence of stressors are those who are cognitively “busy,” making them more 
likely to “make superficial judgments in social situations” without concern for the 
long-run (Kahneman, 2011, Kindle Location 728). 
An example of the importance of the dual processes can be seen in the 
assessment of the costs of participation. For example, a private injury cost, such as 
the hospital bill, appears as a lower cost in the present tense versus when the cost 
actually occurs sometime in the future. The reason for this discounting is a lowered 
system 2 weight, which in turn lowers the value of the potential injury cost in the 
short-run. This allows the potential participant to perceive the costs of participation 
as lower during the riot. Then as the riot dissipates, the system 2 weight increases 
and the individual is provided with an increased perception of cost. A rational 
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individual can therefore be capable of preferring to riot in the short-run and also have 
the capability of regretting their decision in the long-run. 
In sum, the inclusion of dual-processing systems demonstrate how the act of 
rioting can be deemed as a rational choice at the time the decision is made and in the 
short-run due to the dominance of system 1 processing (Thompson, 2010). 
4.3 LONDON RIOTS, MORE THAN A SPECIAL CASE 
The case of the 2011 London Riots possesses similarities to other riots. While 
acknowledging that no two riots are identical, and that even the case selected here for 
comparison maintains several contrasts to the London Riots, there are a sufficient 
number of parallels in order to say that the 2011 London Riots is not a special case. 
This suggests that this model may be applicable to other riots. Yet it should be stated 
that this model is most suitable for analyzing riots that have widespread and copious 
lootings as well as ineffective initial responses from law enforcement.  
A historic riot that greatly resembles the London Riots is the 1992 Los Angeles 
Riots. The Los Angeles Riots mirror London’s in life span, intensity, ineffectiveness of 
law enforcement and behavior among rioters, while also sharing a similar initial 
trigger (Bev, 2011). This riot provides an opportunity to evaluate the long-run costs 
after they have been fully realized, since it occurred over twenty years before the 
London Riots. 
The 1992 Los Angeles Riots, “sparked by a row over racism spread across [Los 
Angeles, California] and for six days the fires burned and the violence raged” 
(Leithead, 2011).  Commander Andrew Smith, a Los Angeles Police Department 
street officer at the time of the 1992 riots stated that “looking at the pictures coming 
out of London really brings back memories of what happened here in Los Angeles 20 
years ago” (Leithead, 2011). After being asked to advise on the aftermath and how 
London could prevent future riots from occurring, Smith pointed out that he sees “a 
lot of parallels with the behaviour of the rioters in London - they did the same things 
here then” (Leithead, 2011). 
A light into the viewpoint of a previous rioter is provided by Najee Ali, who was 
one of the gang members involved in the violence in South Central Los Angeles. He 
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tells of people being “pulled from vehicles and beaten and how local grievances were 
settled with violence and vandalism” (Leithead, 2011). Now that more than twenty 
years have passed since the riots, Ali expresses his sorrowfulness: “We set fire to 
innocent people's property - people who had worked hard to come to America and 
make a better life for themselves…Some of them never recovered and that is 
something we can't repay. But they are doing the same in the UK right now - not 
realising what they are doing, and unfortunately they are going to regret what they 
did” (Leithead, 2011).  
The similarities recognized by journalists, law enforcement and previous Los 
Angeles rioters all point to the London Riots being more than a special case. 
4.4 COST OF PROSECUTION 
An important mechanism presented earlier in this work is that expected 
private penalty of participation is decreasing in n. This is due to the increasing 
inability of law enforcement to identify and arrest the participants committing 
crimes, such as looting, as the riot grows. This resembles the argument in Nyborg and 
Telle (2004) concerning the enforcement of environmental regulations. Nyborg and 
Telle demonstrate how the high costs of bringing the case to trial plays an essential 
role in expected private penalty. However, the work also mentions that limited 
resources play an important role. In the case of riots, it is the limited resources of law 
enforcement that have the greatest effect on expected private penalty. It is important 
to note that the limited capacity of law enforcement may imply multiple equilibria. 
Furthermore, that riots are a good illustration of this, but that the importance of the 
phenomenon extends beyond riots. 
Parallel to law enforcement in general, this study assumes that pursuing 
suspected violators is costly and limited by the budget of the regulator. It is 
furthermore presumed that the regulating government prefers full compliance to the 
law to no compliance, and that this preference is strong since, if no compliance occurs 
the government will be unable to achieve full compliance even if the entire budget is 
spent (Nyborg & Telle, 2004).  As argued in Nyborg and Telle (2004), the budget set 
aside for law enforcement and prosecution must be lower than or equal to the 
(17) 
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resources spent per violator multiplied by the total population of violators. This can 
be shown as:  
      
where   is equal to the resources spent per violator. If the regulator’s budget is strictly 
less than N , then the regulator’s capacity to pursue, and eventually prosecute, 
violators is insufficient and not all violators can be penalized. Dependent on the 
available budget for prosecution and the number of current participants in the riot, a 
participant can expect to face a private penalty, represented by   . This work will 
utilize a simplified version of the equation created by Nyborg and Telle (2004) in 
order to define a rioter’s expected private penalty: 
    {
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where  (
 
 
) denotes the penalty function of regulatory effort and P is the maximum 
penalty. 
This formally demonstrates how the regulator’s ability to prosecute and 
impose penalties on individual rioters is decreasing in n. As the riot grows, the threat 
of private penalty or harsh punishment becomes less credible. When the number of 
violators exceeds the set budget, the threat of private penalty becomes insufficient to 
effectively deter violation which can then lead to the scale of violation increasing.  
In this way it can be said that the high cost of pursuing violators creates 
multiple equilibria, including two stable equilibria. One of these stable equilibria is 
full compliance with the law, which corresponds to a no riot equilibrium, and the 
other is an equilibria where there is no compliance with the law, which corresponds 
to a full riot equilibrium. The tipping point between these two equilibria is where 
potential participants expect full compliance, or no rioting, to be more costly than 
facing the potential private penalty from participation. It should be noted that only 
the expected number of current participants, n, is incorporated in the potential 
(18) 
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participant’s analysis and that this may in fact differ from the actual current 
population of the riot, N. 
In this way it can be said that the limited resources of the regulating 
government defines the private penalty of participation, which in turn affects an 
individual’s net gain from participation. This argument once again highlights the 
importance of the number of expected current participants in a potential rioter’s cost-
benefit analysis, and reinforces the concept that a riot is a conditional decision. 
4.5 POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENT TO THE PRIVATE INTEREST EQUATION 
The current composition of the Riot Threshold Model’s private interest 
equation is the result of careful deliberation on what aspects control a prospective 
rioter’s evaluation for participation. The following variable is given additional 
justification since it is thought to be the most disputable omission to the equation.  
A feasible adjustment to the Riot Threshold Model’s private interest equation 
is the inclusion of a variable for the evaluator's current state of income. The reason 
for this addition to the equation stems from the fact that it has been cited in several 
reports that individual's took into account what they had to loose when making their 
decision. Individuals were cited as considering the loss of current jobs, time taken 
away from the progress of their education, prospects connected to reputation or 
otherwise as well as the corruption of aspirations they hoped to achieve (Morrell et al, 
2011) (R.C. & V.P., 2011). As one mother said, “I would have rioted before, but I’ve got 
a baby now, and a flat. I’ve got too much to lose.’ ‘I’m in college – I’ve got prospects – 
I’m not going to throw that away.’” (R.C. & V.P., 2011, p. 70).   
An argument for the exclusion of the current state of income is that there is 
also an overlap in current state of income and private penalty, since the loss of 
current income can be viewed as an increase in the private penalty. This creates the 
additional problem that if the current state of income was included, some concepts of 
cost may be repeated in the equation, biasing the equation with the weight of certain 
closely related costs.  
It then follows that an additional variable for current income is not included in 
the equation since it is believed that the variable currently representing private 
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penalty, P, is capable of capturing all of the quantitative losses. In this fashion, the P 
variable is charged with accurately representing the prospects and aspirations lost if 
caught and can be said to be equivalent to P(n, I), where private penalty is a function 
of the expected number of participants and current income.  
A second argument for the exclusion of a current state of income variable is 
that it is dependent on, and only occurs if, the individual is captured. This presents an 
additional calculative hardship that could introduction unnecessary error. The final 
argument for not including a separate variable for current state of income is that all 
current income lost from being caught is from sources that would be represented by 
not only qualitative but also quantitative data. This poses the problem of how to 
assess what the value of lost quantitative sources such as "aspirations" may be. This 
would in turn once again increase the likelihood and presence of error in the 
equation, which could then misrepresent the individual's cost-benefit analysis. In 
conclusion, since it is believed that the P variable can absorb all quantitative sources 
of loss that may be represented in a separate current income variable, and since it 
may increase the presence of error in the equitation, a new variable for current state 
of income was kept from the final equation. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The journey that the mind undergoes when making a decision has intrigued 
social scientists for generations (Kahneman, 2011). The knowledge gained from past 
studies encourages further research on the decision-making process as well as on 
what affects an individual’s ability to make rational choices. They also attest to the 
value of exploring whether the everyday actions of the individuals within a larger 
population are rational and how they interact with the choices of others.  
The Riot Threshold Model provides a method for evaluating individual 
decisions in a collective environment as it falls into conflict. According to the Riot 
Threshold Model, the initiation and evolution of a riot is a sequence of individual 
decisions which string together to produce an aggravated collective action. The 
decision-making process is ignited by an analysis of the costs and benefits of 
participation, as seen in the private interest equation, and then weighed against a 
satisfaction of the individual’s threshold requirement at each stage of a riot. A 
potential participant will consider it optimal to riot if everyone else is rioting. The 
individual will likewise consider it optimal to not riot when an insufficient number of 
individuals are expected to be rioting. In this fashion, a group of individuals will 
coordinate their actions towards a full riot or no riot equilibrium. 
In addition to the analysis of costs and benefits being influenced by the 
number of current expected participation, it can be limited to one of the brain’s two 
processing systems, the intuitive system 1, due to the effects of stressors in the riotous 
environment. The net benefit arrived at as a result of a limited analysis is then 
likewise short-sided and blinded to long-run costs. The product is that an individual 
will be biased towards variables representing the short-run benefits that are 
dominated by intuitive reasoning. As a result, the individual is more likely to choose 
participation. This process in total then makes it possible for the utility seeking 
individual, bound by the stressors in their environment, to arrive at the decision that 
participation is beneficial. 
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The explanations and evidence provided for how a potential participant 
evaluates their net gain from participation can be divided into two closely related 
theories. The first is that the evaluation is predominately influenced by the current 
expected number of participants. The second holds that the dominance of system 1 
processing in the decision-making process holds the greatest effect. Both result in the 
lowering of perceived costs and the heightening of perceived benefits. However the 
first suggests that the individual will agree with their initial decision in the long-run, 
while the second allows for the participant to later regret their actions. There is 
support for both alternatives and both seem to play an important role, as seen in the 
selection of stories presented from the 2011 London Riots. Yet it is when these 
theories are combined that they can be applied to the largest number of participants 
of the 2011 London Riots.   
These explanations are said to influence the individual’s analysis separately or 
in a combined fashion. Each explanation is able to add to the theoretical 
understanding of aggravated collective action and lays the foundations for further 
inquiry. According to both explanations, the individual makes a choice based on the 
costs and benefits of participation. However, each one holds a different view of the 
consistency of the individuals’ preferences. The first explanation is fully consistent 
with the standard assumption of stable and time consistent preferences. While the 
latter would violate such assumptions, demonstrating how an individual may go to 
watch the riot, planning not to participate, but that in the midst of the riot may 
choose to join without receiving any new information.   
This study is important because it gives insight to the decision-making process 
of individuals among a riotous crowd. Improvements in crowd management, police 
and riot engagement protocol and citizen education can be rendered as knowledge is 
gained about the evaluations a potential rioter may undertake. As the Temporary 
Assistant Commissioner Chris Allison of the London Metropolitan Police said, “every 
crowd is different, but if you understand it you’re more able to manage it and cope 
with it in a more effective way” (Challenger, Clegg & Robinson, 2009, p. 252). 
The combination and pursuit of multiple areas of study has been undertaken 
in an effort to provide a greater understanding of the decision-making process in a 
riotous environment. The objective of this endeavor was to achieve a synchronizing of 
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the theories of the various disciplines of economics, psychology, neuroscience and 
sociology. This work hopes to add to the growing literature striving to bring a 
unification of understanding of how the mind functions. For it is in the unification of 
these studies that economics is given “a new way to open the "black box" which is the 
building block of economic systems-the human mind” (Camerer et al, 2004).  
One challenge that often presents itself when tackling a concept that extends 
through many disciplines is the inconsistency among the definitions of critical terms 
such as ‘rational’ and ‘decision.’ As pointed out by many of the authors quoted in this 
paper, decision based research may greatly benefit as a whole from any efforts to 
coordinate these terms. These efforts would ensure productive communication 
between the various fields of study (Sanfey et al, 2006). 
In this study, as with many, the time available placed limitations on the scope 
and depth of information that could be gathered. Every effort has been made in order 
to sufficiently address all the models and concepts included. Yet additional 
information can always be of further benefit. One constraint to this study was the 
inability to conduct original empirical and experimental research in order to test the 
Riot Threshold Model. It is therefore a recommendation that experimental research 
be conducted in order to examine the model as well as its applicability. 
An area of interest that could stem from this research is if the Riot Threshold 
Model is able to address the free-rider problem in collective action. Future research 
that is related to, but not directly addressed by this work, could be an analysis of the 
difference between a sufficient level of stress, cognitive load and ego depletion 
(Kahneman, 2011). Such a study may not only greatly add to our understanding of the 
decision-making process in riotous environments, but also provides additional tools 
for crowd management.   
It is difficult to suspend research at any junction, but to do so is to allow the 
call of untold questions to be filled by future investigations. For it is curiosity 
followed by the pursuit of knowledge which drives research to scale the peaks of 
current understanding, only to bring the next summit into plain view. It is therefore 
with the goal of building upon the foundations that have been laid here that this 
academic odyssey rests until the next work begins.  
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